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CONTRACTS: APPLICATION OF USAGE WHERE CONTRARY
TO THE COMMON LAW
The purpose of this note is to study the application of usage in,
the law of contracts, especially where the common law is contrary
to the application thus made. To accomplish this purpose, it will, of
course, be necessary to define usage and custom and distinguish
them, to interpret the phrase "a rule of law" which is often applied
in connection with the application of custom and usage, and to show
the conditions under which usage, contrary to the common law rule
on the subject, will be permitted to affect the meaning of a contract.
The problem is brought to mind by a seemingly ambiguous state-
ment in section 249. of The Restatement of the Law of Contracts,
which states:
"Usage cannot change a rule of law, but usage
may so affect the meaning of a contract that a rule of law
which would be applicable in the absence of the usage
becomes inapplicable."
The explanatory matter on this statement is as follows:
"Long continued usage may develop a rule of
law in accordance with the usage; but when this occurs
there is more than usage as defined in section 245
(custom?) "
Several examples are given, which may best be understood after a
full consideration of subsequent parts of this note, and therefore
they will be considered later.
The explanatory statement of the Restatement, above, leads one
to believe that there is a recognized distinction between "custom"
and "usage," and a cursory examination of the authorities and the
cases bears out this belief. Turning first to the authorities, we find
the following definition in The Restatement of the Law "of Contracts,
section 245:
"Usage is habitual or customary practice. It is
not itself a legal rule, but merely a habit or practice in
fact. It may prevail m a geographic division or in
only a special trade or among a part of the people."
In Williston, Contracts (Student ed. 1926), the following dis-
tinction is made in section 649:
"The terms, custom and usage, are commonly
used interchangeably, though there is a recogmzed dis-
tinction in the meaning of the two words. Custom is such
a usage as has by long and uniform practice become the
law of the-matter to which it relates. Usage derives its
efficacy from the assent thereto-of parties to the trans-
action;, custom derives its efficacy from its adoptioni.nto
the law, and when once established is binding irrespective
of any manifestation of. assent by parties concerned."
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In cases involving custom and usage, we find, although there ap-
pears to be no uniformity on the subject, that "custom" and "usage"
are generally regarded as separable and distinct. However, a few
courts fail or refuse to distinguish between custom and usage:
"The courts have for a long time used the term
'custom' as coordinate with 'usage' and we will so regard
it in our consideration of this case."'
"Two questions are suggested by the objection:
First, does evidence of usage possess any probative value
in cases of this character? and, second, if it does, must the
custom be pleaded to justify its admission?"-
"But it will be seen by an examination of the
cases and by reference to the elementary works, that
the words usage, custom,-course of trade are used inter-
changeably "'
The majority recognize a distinction between custom and usage:
" custom is such usage as has acquired the
force of law."'
"As has often been said, a lawful custom is
itself part of the common law, while a lawful usage,
proved and shown to affect both parties, may be de-
scribed as the law of their case."
"Usage is a repetition of acts, and is distin-
guished from custom in that usage is a fact, while custom
is a law. There may be usage without custom, but there
can be no custom without usage to accompany it or pre-
cede it Usage, then is the germ, which, by con-
stant repetition, and general use, and great antiquity de-
velops into custom "2
"For strictly speaking, custom is that length of
usage which has become law. It is a usage which has ac-
quired the force of law, and ignorance of the law will not
excuse. A general custom is the common law itself, or a
part of it.' -7
The distinction here noted is of great importance in the applica-
tion of "custom" and "usage." It is also to be noted that this dis-
tinction is important in the field of evidence as to the proof necessary
for the application to take effect, a phase we shall not consider here.
'Aulich et al. v Craigmyle et al., 248 Ky 676, 681, 59 S.W 2d
560 (1933)
"Brunke v Missouri & K. Telephone Co., 115 Mo. App. 36, -
90 S.W 753, 754 (1905).
'Richmond et al. v. The Union Steamboat Co., 87 N.Y. 240, 249
(1881).
'Gersetav. Silk Ass'n of America, 222 N.Y.S. 11, 13 (1927)
'Nicoll V. Pittsvein Coal Co., 269 Fed. 968, 971 (1920).
'AmercarYLead Pencil Co. v Nashville, C. & St..L. Ry., 124
Tenn,57, - 134 S.W 613, 615 °(1911).
-Will"v.'Bailey 49 N.Y. 464, 471, I0 Am. Rep. 407 (1872).
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The phrase, "a rule of law," so often used in cqnpction with
custom and usage, and its probable equivalent, "a positive rule of
law," might be construed separately from their context in several
different ways. But it becomes apparent, after an examination of the
cases on custom and usage that a rule referred to in connection with
such statements is invariably a rule of the common law. There- are
also sufficient grounds for limiting this expression ("a rule of law")
to a rule of the common law. Two other possibilities are apparent:
(1) Statutory law- and (2) application being itself a "rule of law."
The first we reject because of two reasons. Usage must not be con-
trary to public policy- and statutes are recognized as a supreme ex-
pression of public policy. Also, the highest goal to which usage may
aspire is tb become a custom, which we have seen is the common law,
or a part thereof. Since the common law is subservient to statutory
law, usage must be so. Thus, if the phrase "a rule of law" were in-
terpreted to mean statutory law, it would have little or no meaning
and little or no practical use for our purpose. This is not to say that
usage may have no effect in regard to statutory law, however, for
as we are to see, this is emphatically not true. As to the possibility
of the phrase "a rule of law" including application thereof, tis must
be rejected, as it would make our entire rule meaningless. Under
such an interpretation, the section of the Restatement would read
in effect: "Usage cannot change the application of a rule of law, but
may change the application of a rule of law. " It is believed that
by regarding "a rule of law" to mean "a rule of the common law"
the section of the Restatement which we are discussing can be made
of value.
This brings us to the application of custom to factual situations.
As we have seen, a fully developed custom is itself a rule of law,
and exists as a part of the common law. As such, it is treated like
other common law rules and principles. It cannot prevail over statu-
tory law when the two are in conflict. However, where the custom
has been enacted into statutory law, the custom may be looked to
in cases of doubt, and may be used to decide what the law was
meant to include. An example of this is found in Date v. Pattison*
where the court said:
"It is no answer to say that a trade custom or
usage should not prevail against clear and unequvocal
rules of law. This is a petitio principii. The question under
consideration is whether certain portions of the written
law are to be given by construction an effect different
from that expressed in their language, on the ground that
by authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court of the
State the asserted policy has been found to be implied in
them. Since it seems to us that neither the statutes nor
the decisions go to the extent that is claimed.for them by
appellants, we may refer to' the established custom as
234 U.S. 399, 411 (1914)
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evidence of what has long been understood as the law;
for as this court held such usages (customs) are to
be judicially recognized as a part of the law."
Also, where trade words or phrases are used in the statute, the
custom of the trade as to the meaning of such words will control.
This is best illustrated by the decision in Pennell v. Philadelphza ,
Reading Ry' where the court said:
"1 the custom of the railroads could not, of
course, justify a violation of the statute, but that custom,
having the acquiescence of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, is persuasive of the meaning of the statute." (De-
termining whether locomotives are "cars" within the
meaning of the statute.)
Considering the application of usage, we may first consult the
authorities on the subject.
"It is also essential that a usage shall be con-
sistent with rules of law, for 'a universal usage cannot be
set up against the general law. If it is inconsistent with
any rule of the common law, or with any statute, or is
contrary to public policy it cannot be recognized. A usage,
however, is not contrary to rules of law in his sense,
merely because it makes the law applicable to the particu-
lar contract different from what it would be if the usage
were not imported into the contract. This is generally the
object and the natural effect of proving a usage.....
Finding here some food for thought, but certainly much to be
desired, we turn to Williston on the subject:
"The belief of individuals or of a community
that a rule of law is something different from what it
actually is will not change the rule of law Nor will it
make any difference if the members of the community
habitually settle disputes in accordance with their errone-
ous belief. At least, a habit must be general and continue
for a long time before the common law will adopt the cus-
tom as a part of itself. But if two individuals of such a
community make a contract with one another with refer-
ence to a matter to which a well known habit or usage
applies, and if the common law does not forbid the appli-
cation of the customary rule if the parties agree thereto, a
different problem is presented. The only question now is
whether the parties to the contract have agreed impliedly
to be bound by the usage. They cannot change the rule
of law, but they can change its application to themselves
if they agree to do so.
"Broad statements, therefore, which are some-
times made, that usage or custom cannot change a rule of
law, must be accepted with some reservation. The rule of
law cannot be changed, but its application to the case
may be prevented. The facts as they appear to be apart
from the usage are altered by the additional agreement
231 U.S. 675, 680 (1912)
O CLARK, CONTRACTS, sec. 498 (3d ed. 1914).
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which is implied because the parties contracted with ref-
erence to the usage. The additional facts make a rule of
law applicable which would not have been applicable in
the absence of the usage. Otherwise it would have been
idle to introduce evidence of it. Indeed the very existence
or non-existence of a contract may depend upon-
usage "12
This clarifies the rule to a great extent, but does not make clear
when and how the rule will be applied. Therefore we shall turn to
the cases, and then consider some examples of the application in
question. A fairly recent Federal decision, with the cases cited there-
in, is most helpful for a complete understanding of the statements
previously made. In that case the court said:
"It is well settled that a trade usage which is
contrary to a statute or which contravenes public policy
is invalid and may not be invoked; but where a rule of
law is of a character that the parties may make it map-
plicable to their contract by express agreement they may
likewise render it inapplicable by implied agreement or by
usage. Many rules of law apply only in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary.""'
The cases there cited throw further light upon the statements
made. Although the law is that wild animals become property only
when fully and actually taken into possession, in Swife v. Gifford,"
it was held that a usage is valid that a whale goes to the boat which
sinks the first iron that holds if claim is made by that boat before
the other boat cuts the whale. It was there stated: "Principles of law
differ in their importance as well as in their origin; and while some
of them represent great rules of policy, and are beyond the reach of
convention, others may be changed by parties who chose to contract
upon a different footing; and some of them may be varied by usage
"I' The judge in his decision cited Wigglesworth v. Dallison'" in
which the law gave the crops of an outgoing tenant to his landlord.
Despite this, usage, which made them the property of the tenant, was
held to be valid. Grznman v. Walker 6 gives another example in point.
By common law of that day notice of protest by mail, when the
person lives in the same town, was not good. Plaintiff in that case
proposed to prove usage of banking houses to give notice by mail,
and that the defendants knew the custom. On objection this was
rejected. The court on appeal, however, said: "It is objected that this
usage, or custom, if proved, would be inconsistent with the rule of
law, and would therefore be void. It is indisputably true that
parties to a contract may vary or restrain by express stipulation
"WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, sec. 651 (Stud. ed. 1926)
"Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 F 2d 425, 431 (1936)
"'23 Fed. Cas. 558, No. 13,696 (D.C. Mass. 1872).
"Ibid, p. 559.
1 Doug. 201, 99 Eng. Rep. 132 (1779)
69 Iowa 426, 428 (1859).
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certain rules of law, so far as they would otherwise apply to, and
govern their contract. Usage, when established, affords, the same
evidence of intention as the most direct language, and may have the
same effect upon the application of legal rules. If, therefore, it would
be competent to prove that the parties contracted that notice should
be given through the post office, the same may be shown by proving
a usage to that effect. " A good summary is also found in Colket
V Ellis,' where the judge said: "Without further reference to the
numerous cases on this subject, I think their effect may be summed
up to be, that where no statute or principal of public policy inter-
venes, but a rule of law is a mere privilege which may be waived,
there is no reason why the. waiver may not be as well by a custom
(usage) known to and acquiesced in oy the parties, as by an express
contract." For a further distinction, a portion of the case of Adams
v Pittsburgh Ins. Co.," may be observed: "In Vanness v. Pacard, 2
Pet. U.S. Rep. 148, it was held that evieence was properly received
to prove that a custom and usage existed in the city of Washington
which authorized a tenant to remove any building erected by him.
In Gordon v. Little, 8 S. & R. 433, it is hela, a usage or custom vary-
ing the liability of common carriers by water from that of the com-
mon law may be proved. Usage may add a new construction
variant from the face of the instrument, as much as if it had been
contained in a new clause or by reference to it: Eyre v. Marsne Ins.
Co., 5 W & S. 116." It might be noted that where usages are not per-
mitted to vary -the application of rules of the common law, the court
generally declares merely that, "Usage cannot be permitted to change
a settled rule of law," and does not specify the reason in the particu-
lar case.1'
Can we draw from this discussion a less confusing rule for deal-
ing with usages than that stated in the Restatement? At least two
efforts have been made to clarify this rule, both of which, in the
opinion of this writer, have failed. Chapman, J., in the case of
Dickinson v Gay," reached a conclusion that the only usages sus-
tained, where a different result was reached after application of the
usage than would have been reached by the common law in its
absence, were usages having reference solely to methods of transact-
ing business. This is refuted by many of the cases which are dis-
cussed herein, as other usages are shown to have been applied. John
D. Lawson, a rather productive writer of the late 19th century and an
authority suggested the following in an article on the subject:
"Usage and custom control the rules of law applicable to particular
"7 10 Phila. 375, 378 (1875).
" 95 Pa. 348, 355 (1880)
" Pate Lumber Co. v Weathers, 167 Miss. 228, 146 So. 433
(1933) Fed. Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v Sydeman, 82 N.H. 482, 136
Atl. 136 (1927) Griggs-Paxon Shoe Co. v Friedheim Bros., 133 S.C.
458, 131 S.E. 620 (1926).
'7 Allen (Mass.) 29, 35-37, 83 Am. Dec. 656 (1863).
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circumstances, provided it be known and understood by the parties,
and be reasonable. A usage is unreasonable when it conflicts with a
rule of public policy, and in many other instances."2' This appears to
be too broad to serve as a guide in the consideration of factual
situations.
In conclusion, it is suggested that the following might serve as
a basis for determining a more serviceable guide in dealing with the
application of custom and usage.
Neither custom nor usage may prevail in express derogation of
statutory law, or the express purpose thereof, but custom or usage
may be considered:
(1) in determining the purpose and extent of a statute, where
the statute in question appears to be a codification of such
custom or usage, and
(2) in the interpretation of words common to the industry or
trade, where such words are not expressly defined by the
statute.
Usage may be given consideration in determining the relation-
ship and intent of the parties, even though such a usage requires a
result other than that required by the common law in the absence
of such usage, provided such usage
(1) is reasonable,
(2) is not contrary to public policy or public morals,
(3) is not repugnant to the expressed intention of the parties,
(4) is not forbidden by the common'law rule which it avoids by
its application, and
(5) can be presumed to have been in the minds of the parties
when the coritract was made.
Though this leaves many questions unanswered, it may prove
helpful in a fuller consideration of the subject. It is to be hoped that
the courts will at a future date give more attention to the question
involved, and attempt to clarify their position on it instead of merely
reiterating a maxim of dubious utility and questionable application.
DELBERT L. McLAUGHLIN
2' Lawson, The Power of Usage and Custom to Control or Alter
Rules of Law, 7 So. L. REV. (N. S.) 1, 56 (1881). (Conclusion of two
articles on the subject. A complete book on Custom and Usage by
this writer has been published, which was not available to this writer.
See, in particular, Sections 225 and 248).

